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NOTE
THE BEST INTEREST TEST AND CHILD
CUSTODY: WHY TRANSGENDER
SHOULD NOT BE A FACTOR IN
CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Kari J. Cartert
My mother's not happy in the body she is in. My mom is a lot
happier since starting to live as who she wants to be. When I
was 13, my mother said, 'I want to be a man, do you care?' I
said, 'No. As long as you are the same person inside and still
love me. I don 't care what you are on the outside.' It's like a
chocolate bar, it's got a new wrapper but it's the same
chocolate inside.'
- 14-year old daughter of a female-to-male transsexual parent.
INTRODUCTION
Every day in the United States a judge determines whether it is in
the best interests of a child to award custody to a divorcing mother or
father. In applying this standard, courts consider a number of factors,
including, inter alia, the physical, mental, emotional and social needs
of the child; the parent's ability and desire to meet those needs; and
the moral fitness of the parent.2 The breadth of the best interests of the
t J.D. Candidate 2006, Case Western Reserve University School of Law;
B.B.A. 1999, Ohio University. I would like to thank Professor Jessica Berg and Erica
Barnhill for their guidance in writing this note. I would also like to thank Kevin
Samuels for his support and patience throughout law school and during the writing
process, and to my parents, Stephen and Patricia Carter, for their love and
encouragement of my education. The views set forth herein do not necessarily reflect
those of the law firm with which the author is to be associated.
1 Richard Green, Transsexuals' Children, 2 INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM 4
(1998), available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0601.htm.
2 Jovanna Vujovic, Note, Child Custody and Visitation, 5 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 477, 482-85 (2004) (discussing the evolution of child custody laws to reflect
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child test allows judges wide discretion in their decision-making.3
This discretion allows a judge to consider factors that may negatively
impact a child's life.4 However, courts have identified factors such as
parent's race and religion as being outside the court's analysis; thus,
considering them non-factors in child custody decisions.5
Recently courts have addressed whether a parent's sexual orienta-
tion should be used when determining the custodial placement of a
child. Case analysis reveals that the judicial system is currently split
on how to treat a parent's sexual preference in relation to custody de-
terminations; some courts only consider homosexuality if it negatively
impacts the child, other courts view a gay parent as a per se ban on
custody.6 Related to the confusion is the issue of how a court should
treat a parent who identifies with the gender opposite to that which he
was born.
This Note argues that a person's gender identity is a factor that
should not be considered in child custody decisions unless there is
evidence of a likely negative impact on the best interests of the child.
Part I reviews Kantaras v. Kantaras, an instructive child custody case
awarding custody to a female-to-male transgender who played the role
of the children's father for nine years prior to the custody hearing.
Part II provides a brief overview of child custody decisions and de-
scribes the best interests of the child standard. Part III supplies a defi-
nition of transgender. Further, it reviews the history of transgenders
and child custody, illustrating how courts have traditionally treated
this factor. Part III also explores the scientific data associated with the
impact of transgender parents on their children. Part IV discusses the
use of personal characteristics like race, religion, and sexual orienta-
tion as factors for determining child custody decisions under the guise
of the best interests of the child standard. Part V argues that courts
changes in society's position regarding marriage, family and gender).
3 Nan D. Hunter, Federal Courts, State Courts and Civil Rights: Judicial
Power and Politics, 92 GEO. L.J. 941,964 (2004) (book review).
4 See Daniel A. Krauss et al., Legal Standards, Expertise, and Experts in the
Resolution of Contested Child Custody Cases, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 843, 843-
44 (2000).
5 See Ficker v. Ficker, 62 S.W.3d 496, 499 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling that
"favoring or tending to favor one religious persuasion over another in a child custody
dispute [is] intolerable to our system of law."). See also Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d
897, 899 (Ky. 1987) (refusing to consider the mother's subsequent biracial marriage
as a reason to modify a custody decree).
6 Elizabeth Erin Bosquet, Contextualizing and Analyzing Alabama's Ap-
proach to Gay and Lesbian Custody Rights, 51 ALA. L. REv. 1625, 1627 (2000) (pro-
posing that denial of custody because of a parent's homosexuality, without other
considerations, does not promote what is in the best interests of the child).
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should not consider a parent's gender dysphoria unless it is likely that
the child may suffer negative harm because of the parent's transgen-
derism. This section proposes that gender dysphoria is an immutable
characteristic present in today's families. It further predicts that social
science data is the key to facilitating legal acceptance of this ap-
proach. This Note concludes with the idea that courts must approach
families involving transgender parents by considering what is truly in
the best interests of the child, the same way they currently approach
non-transgender families.
I. THE KANTARAS DECISION-AN ILLUSTRATIVE
CASE
In 2003, a custody case of first impression in Florida decided
whether a transgender has the right to marry and be a parent.7 After
weighing the evidence for a year, a Florida Circuit Court judge deter-
mined that though born a woman, a transgender's marriage to a
woman was legally valid and that it was in the best interests of two
children to remain in the parental custody of the transgender father.8
This decision was carried on Court TV and was accompanied by an
800-page opinion, which provided an in-depth analysis of the science
behind transgenders.
9
Michael Kantaras was born female but completed sex-
reassignment in 1987.10 In 1988, Michael and Linda Forsythe met at
work and became friends.' During this time both Michael and Linda
were dating other people.' 2 However, Michael and Linda were also
intimate and Linda became aware of Michael's gender reassignment.13
Linda became pregnant as a result of her other relationship, but the
father of the baby moved away.14 During the pregnancy Michael emo-
tionally supported Linda and was present at the birth of her son, Mat-
7 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (leaving
the child custody decision to be considered upon remand).
8 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 808-09 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21,
2003), available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf.
9 Id. at 14, 519-25, 729-73. This opinion has been criticized for its focus on
gender identity rather than positive parental qualities. See Elizabeth C. Barcena, Kan-
taras v. Kantaras: How a Victory for One Transsexual May Hinder the Sexual Minor-
ity Movement, 12 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 101, 102 (2004).
10 Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 17 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003),
available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf.
" Id. at 15.
12 Id.
1 Id at 16.
'4 Id. at 15.
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thew.15 Shortly after Matthew's birth, Michael began living with
Linda and Matthew.' 6 Six weeks after Matthew was born, Michael
and Linda were married. 7 Shortly thereafter, Michael legally adopted
Matthew. 18 In 1991, Linda was artificially inseminated with sperm
from Michael's brother and she became pregnant. 19 Their daughter,
Irina, was born in 1992.20
During their nine-year marriage, Michael and Linda raised the
two children together. 21 At the time of the divorce and custody
decision the children were eleven and fourteen years old.22 Linda was
aware that Michael was a transgender before she married him. 23
During the divorce proceeding Linda decided that she was not
comfortable with Michael's transgender identity and asked the court
to invalidate the marriage and deny Michael any parental rights, solely
because he was a transgender.24
In making the custody decision, the court relied heavily on the
testimony and findings of a court-appointed psychologist and an inde-
pendent court-appointed therapist who evaluated the Kantaras family
to determine the best interests of the children. 25 Although the psy-
chologist did not personally interview any of the Kantaras family,
when asked whether sex reassignment surgery has a negative impact
on a transgender's ability to be a parent, the psychologist responded
that the surgery has no impact on parenting abilities.26 The psycholo-
gist further stated that he would have no concern if "a court award[ed]
custody to a transsexual man who has completed the sex reassignment
process ... if he's a good parent ... 27
After interviewing the family, the therapist considered the follow-
ing ten factors to determine which parent, Michael or Linda, bettered
the interests of the Kantaras children:
1) The parent who is more likely to allow the child frequent
and continuing contact with the nonresidential parent... [;]
1" Id. at 15-16.
16 Id. at 17.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 18.
'9 Id. at 19.
20 id.
21 Id. at 13, 18.
22 Id. at 15-16,
23 Id. at 16.
24 See id. at 6.
25 Id. at 777, 790.
26 Id. at 294.
27 Id.
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2) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing be-
tween the parents and the child... [;]
3) The capacity and disposition of the parents to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care,
and other material needs ... [;]
4) The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfac-
tory, environment and the desirability of maintaining continu-
ity... [;]
5) The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or pro-
posed custodial home;
6) The moral fitness of the parents ... [;]
7) The mental and physical health of the parents... [;]
8) The home, school, and community record of the child...
[;]
9) The reasonable preference of the child, if the [c]ourt deems
the child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding and
experience to express a preference... [;] [and]
10) The willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and
encourage a close and continuing parent-child relationship be-
tween the children and the other parent.28
In response to the factor concerning the moral fitness of the parents,
the therapist stated, "neither parent presents as 'immoral' in the sense
of drug or alcohol abuse, criminal record, child physical or sexual
abuse, or sexual misconduct."29 In fact, nowhere in the therapist's best
interests analysis is Michael's transgender mentioned.3 °
After studying the family, the therapist determined that Michael
was the better parent; Michael scored higher than Linda on nine of the
ten child custody considerations identified above.31 Michael was
found to have superior parenting skills and mental stability, while the
court noted expert testimony from a series of court-appointed coun-
selors suggesting that Linda suffered from a borderline personality
disorder.32 The therapist also testified that Linda Kantaras had tried to
turn the children against Michael. 33 In the section assessing the prefer-
ence of the children, the court stated, "The legal consequences of in-
28 Id. at 785-89.
29 Id. at 786 (emphasis added).
30 Id. at 785-89.
31 Id. at 422, 790.
32 Id. at 790.
33 Id. at 789-90.
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terpreting the statutory law of marriage should not result in the de-
struction of these two bright and lovely children.
34
On February 23, 2003, the Florida Circuit Court granted the
Kantaras' a divorce. 35 The court also determined that it was in the best
interests of the children to remain in the parental custody of
Michael.36
However, on July 23, 2004, the Second District Court of Appeal
of Florida found the marriage between Michael and Linda Kantaras
void ab initio because Michael was not a "male" when the marriage
occurred and the marriage between same-sex couples is not recog-
nized in the state of Florida.37 The court did not reverse the custody
determination of the prior decision but left this issue for examination
upon remand.38
II. CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS & THE BEST
INTERESTS STANDARD
Child custody claims lie within state jurisdiction and such dis-
putes regularly appear in state and local courts.39 When addressing
child custody claims, the court system makes a presumption that chil-
dren, unlike adults, are unable to determine and safeguard their own
interests. 40 As a result, child placement laws are intended to ensure
that children are provided an environment that sufficiently serves their
needs.4' Child custody decisions are typically not reviewable and are
not overturned unless the trial court commits gross and palpable er-
14 Id. at 789.
31 Id. at 791.
36 Id. at 799. For more details on this case, see Barcena, supra note 9.
37 Kantaras v. Kantaras, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 10997, at *19 (Fla. Ct. App.
2004); See also Chris Tisch, Transsexual Again Argues for Custody, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 22, 2005, at 3B (giving an overview of the Kantaras's latest appear-
ance in court and stating that the appeals court ruled that "gender is established at
birth and a change in that gender cannot be legally recognized.").
38 Kantaras, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 10997, at *19-20. See also Tisch, supra
note 37, at 3B (stating that the legal arguments have been completed and the child
custody determination now lies in the hands of Judge O'Brien, the same judge that
heard the original Kantaras case).
39 See David Rayside, Family Law and Policy, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER HISTORY IN AMERICA 367, 368 (Marc
Stein ed., 2004).
40 JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD: THE LEAST
DETRIMENTAL ALTERNATIVE 5 (1996).
41 Id.
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ror.42 Such an unpredictable decision setting provides extraordinary
risks for a transgender parent.43
In cases where the dissolving marriage consists of a natural and
non-natural parent, many states make a presumption in favor of the
natural parent.44 This presumption is made even when the non-natural
parent has functioned as a parent.45 Non-natural parents seeking cus-
tody of a child must usually prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the natural parent is unfit.46 However, surrogacy and same-sex
parent law indicate a shift in judicial thought and courts are granting
custody to non-natural parents who intended the birth of the child.47
Therefore, unless Michael Kantaras, as a non-natural parent, is able to
use the therapist's testimony to prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that Linda Kantaras is unfit, Linda will most likely receive cus-
42 Annamay T. Sheppard, Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's Journey Into
Day, in REPRODUCTION, SEXUALITY, AND THE FAMILY 27, 36 (Karen J. Maschke ed.,
1997).
43 Id. (discussing how the unpredictable decision-setting in child custody
hearings is risky for a lesbian parent).
4 Cheryl Buehler & Jean M. Gerard, Divorce Law in the United States: A
Focus on Child Custody, 44 FAM. REL. 439, 440 (1995). See also Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 1, 2 (2001). For example,
Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Kansas and Virginia all cite a strong preference for award-
ing custody to a natural parent instead of third parties. See Le Roy v. Odgers, 503
P.2d 975, 977 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972) (holding that parental custody of children is
"both a natural and a legal right"); Daugharty v. Daugharty, 571 So. 2d 85, 86 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the rights of parents are paramount); Conroy v.
Jones, 232 S.E.2d 917, 918 (Ga. 1977) (holding that a natural parent can only lose
custody if he is found to be unfit); Irwin v. Irwin, 505 P.2d 634, 640 (Kan. 1973)
(enforcing the parental right doctrine); and Judd v. Van Horn, 81 S.E.2d 432, 436
(Va. 1954) (stating that the best interests of the child "[are] subject to the condition
that a fit parent with a suitable home has a right to the custody of his child superior to
the rights of others").
45 See Buehler & Gerard, supra note 44, at 444. See also Principles of the
Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 44, at 2.
4 Buehler & Gerard, supra note 44, at 444. See also Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, supra note 44, at 2.
47 Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 782 (Cal. 1993) cert. denied, 510 U.S.
874 (1993) (awarding custody to a heterosexual couple who intended the birth of the
child over the biological surrogate mother); Southfox v. Southfox, No. D453867 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Jan. 19, 2000) (holding that two lesbian partners were the parents of a child
genetically related to one of them); J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1322 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996) (holding mother's former same-sex partner had standing to seek partial
custody of the child because she stood in loco parentis to the child); In re Custody of
H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995) (holding same-sex partner can seek
visitation if she proves she has a parent-like relationship with the child and the bio-
logical parent has interfered substantially with that relationship). But see Lynda A.H.
v. Diane T.O., 673 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding same-sex
partner lacked standing to seek visitation with former partner's biological child).
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tody of the first child, Matthew. However, the fate of the second Kan-
taras child is yet to be determined since Michael, although not the
natural parent, intended the birth of Irina.
The purpose of this Note is not to analyze the natural parent pre-
sumption, nor is it to analyze the new case law surrounding surrogacy
and same-sex parents. However, such background information is
needed to understand the information discussed herein. The purpose is
to discuss the application of the best interests of the child standard in a
situation either involving a transgendered natural parent of the child at
issue or involving a transgendered intentional non-natural parent of
the child at issue.
In the absence of a private child custody agreement, and some-
times even where there is an agreement, the courts will often intervene
in child custody issues.48 In such situations the court will apply, with
the intention of protecting the child's psychological and physical well-
being, the "best interest of the child" (BLOC) standard to determine
the parental rights and responsibilities of each parent.49 In determining
what is in the best interests of the child, courts often employ court-
appointed investigators and experts who interview the parents and
children. 0
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act5 1 (UMDA), presented
by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, provides the following
factors as a guideline to determine the child's best interests:
(a) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his/her
custody;
(b) the wishes of the child as to his/her custodian;
(c) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with
his/her parent or parents, his/her siblings, and any
other person who may significantly affect the child's best in-
terest;
(d) the child's adjustment to his or her home, school, and
community; and
4' GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 40, at 5.
49 Id. See also Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Divorce Pro-
ceedings, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677 (1994). Most states actually prefer joint legal
and physical custody. In the absence of a situation conducive to joint custody, states
apply the BlOC standard. See Mary Ann Mason et al., Family Law for Changing
Families in the New Millennium, in HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY FAMILIES:
CONSIDERING THE PAST, CONTEMPLATING THE FUTURE 432, 436 (Marilyn Coleman &
Lawrence H. Ganong eds., 2004).
5o Sheppard, supra note 42, at 36.
51 UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 282 (1998).
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(e) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved.
5 2
The court shall not consider conduct of a parent that does not af-
fect his relationship to the child.5 3 All fifty states have included either
portions or the entirety of the UMDA's BlOC standard in their stat-
utes or through case law.54 However, there is a lack of consensus
among legal, judicial, and mental health communities regarding a
child's best interests and courts have considerable discretion to make
case-by-case decisions.55
The BIOC standard is often criticized because the vast discretion
provided to the judge allows bias to enter the judgment.5 6 Wide dis-
cretion and little oversight allow judges to use their individual subjec-
tive attitudes about parent behaviors and choices to resolve custody
disputes. 57 For instance, if a judge determines that factors such as a
parent's religion, lifestyle preferences, gender, or race are important to
a child's welfare, such factors may be used to determine a parent's
custody award. 58 In fact, a preference for a "traditional lifestyle" and
the parent who can provide such a lifestyle is one of the main factors
used to determine the best interests of the child.59 Typically, the inclu-
sion of such factors in the application of the BlOC standard "usually
reflect[s] prejudice rather than a rational assessment of the child's
welfare. 6°
52 Buehler & Gerard, supra note 44, at 439; UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
ACT § 402.
53 Buehler & Gerard, supra note 44, at 439.
4 Id
"55 Id. (stating that the BlOC standard allows for individualized decision and
great judicial discretion).
56 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 44, at 2 (providing
an overview of the law governing child custody determinations).
57 Mark Strasser, Fit to be Tied: On Custody, Discretion, and Sexual Orien-
tation, 46 AM. U.L. REV. 841, 843 (1997).
58 Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80
CAL. L. REV. 615, 616 (1992). See also Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
supra note 44, at 2.
59 Susan Beth Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of
the Child" Standard in Custody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 845, 868 (1997).
60 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, supra note 44, at 11.
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III. TRANSGENDERS AND CHILD CUSTODY
A. Definition of Transgender
Transgender-related topics often begin with a debate about the
definition of sex versus gender and whether such characteristics are
immutable or can be changed. 6' The term "sex" is often used by social
scientists to refer to the anatomical or biological female or male char-
acteristics.62 On the other hand, "gender" refers to the characteristics
that culture associates with a male or female.63
The concepts of transgenderism and transsexuality were not
widely known in the United States until after World War 1I.64 Regard-
less of its beginnings, the definition of what constitutes a transgender
and the reasoning behind the concept is greatly debated both within
and among the medical, academic, psychological, and activist profes-
sions; not to mention the differences between individual transgender
experiences.65
In general, the transgender definition 66 includes "transsexual
people (who may or may not pursue medical treatments to change
their bodies), cross-dressers, 'drag queens,' 'drag kings,' and men and
women, regardless of sexual orientation, whose appearance or
characteristics are perceived to be gender atypical. 67 A person's
identification of himself or herself as a male or female is their gender
61 For a full discussion on this topic see Briana Lynn Morgan, Note, The Use
of Rules and Standards to Define a Transsexual's Sex for the Purpose of Marriage:
An Argument for a Hybrid Approach, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1329 (2004).
Jamison Green, Introduction to PAISLEY CURRAH & SHANNON MINTER,
TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1, 2
(2000), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/transeq.pdf (distinguish-
ing the terms "sex" and "gender").
63 Id.
64 Walter L. Williams, Transsexuals, Transvestites, Transgender People, and
Cross-Dressers, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
HISTORY IN AMERICA 203, 203 (Marc Stein ed., 2004) (discussing how transsexuality
surgery and research began in Europe).
65 Id.
66 The terms "transgender" and "transsexual" will be used interchangeably
throughout this Note to refer to a person who identifies himself as a transgender.
67 JASON CIANCIOTrO & SEAN CAHILL, THE POL'Y INST. OF THE NAT'L GAY
AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, EDUCATION POLICY: ISSUES AFFECTING LESBIAN, GAY,
BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER YOUTH 12 (2003), available at http://www.thetaskforce.
org/downloads/EducationPolicy.pdf. See also VIVIANE K. NAMASTE, INVISIBLE LIVES:
THE ERASURE OF TRANSSEXUAL AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE 1 (2000) (defining a
transgender as an "individual[] whose gendered self-presentation (evidenced through
dress, mannerisms, and even physiology) does not correspond to the behaviors ha-
bitually associated with the members of their biological sex.").
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identity. 68 Gender expression refers to how a person expresses their
gender identity, through behavior,. clothing, or appearance.69
Transgenders "include those who identify with the gender opposite
their birth sex., 70 Female-to-male transgenders (FTM) are born with
female bodies but identify with the male gender, whereas male-to-
female transgenders (MTF) are born with male bodies but identify
with the female gender.7 1
A major debate surrounding the transgender definition is whether
it includes only people who obtain sex reassignment surgery or hor-
mones or whether such a definition includes men or women who iden-
tify themselves as the gender opposite that which they were born.72
The surgical procedure involved in a male-to-female sex-reassignment
surgery includes removal of the penis, creation of an artificial vagina
by turning the penis inside out, and rerouting of the urethra.73 The
female-to-male sex-reassignment surgery involves a number of sur-
geries, including phalloplasty (construction of a penis), mastectomy,
and hysterectomy. 74 Due to the number of surgeries and resulting dif-
ficulties involved in the female-to-male sex-reassignment surgery,
many opt for a phalloscrotal prosthesis or an elongated clitoris, which
results from taking hormones.75
The number of transgenders residing in the United States is uncer-
76 etmtain. One estimate placed the number of postoperative transsexuals
in the United States as potentially three to nine million.77 If non-
surgical and cross-dressing individuals are added to the definition of
68 CIANcIOTro & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 12. The terms "gender dyspho-
ria," "gender identity," and "transgenderism" will be used interchangeably throughout
this Note to refer to a person's identification with the gender opposite that which he
was born.
69 id.
70 Id.
71 Green, supra note 62, at 3.
72 CIANCIOTrO & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 12; GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE,
TRANSGENDER NATION 16 (1994). The long-term effects of the hormonal treatments
are currently unknown. Tarynn M. Witten et al., Transgender and Transsexuality, in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEX AND GENDER: MEN AND WOMEN IN THE WORLD'S CULTURES
216, 227 (Carol R. Ember & Melvin Ember eds., 2004).
" MACKENZIE, supra note 72, at 17-18 (also describing a number of addi-
tionally requested surgeries intended to change the male's outward appearance to that
of a female, including breast enlargement and face surgery).
74 Id. at 18 (noting that surgically constructed penises are usually "dysfunc-
tional in both urinary and sexual terms").
71 Id. at 20.
76 Id. at 16-17 (citing unreliable data regarding the number of sex reassign-
ment surgeries, operations in foreign countries, and private surgeries as reasons for
the discrepancy).
Witten, supra note 72, at 219.
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transgender, the above estimate rises to approximately twenty million
people.78
A debate residing in the medical profession is whether
transgenderism is a mental disorder. 79 The DSM IV-TR classifies a
"transgendered or transsexual" person as having a psychiatric
disorder, given the name gender identity disorder (GID). 80 However,
there are no known biological or medical reasons or social causes for
the disorder.8 '
B. History of Transgenders and Child Custody
The path to a child custody issue involving a transgender involves
a number of legal steps, all of which are not consistently treated in
state legislatures or courts.82 Most states have yet to decide what
makes someone "legally" a male or a female. 83 Transgenders can enter
a marriage in one of two ways: (1) they can be in a legal, heterosexual
marriage prior to their gender identity change or (2) they can identify
themselves as a transgender and subsequently enter a marriage. 84 Re-
gardless of the beginnings, a transgender marital relationship can in-
volve children either through a biological tie with one parent, assisted
reproductive technologies, adoption, or surrogacy.
78 id.
79 MACKENZIE, supra note 72, at 78 (discussing how doctors view a trans-
gender's mental disorder as treatable by surgical techniques but not psychotherapy).
80 Witten, supra note 72, at 220-21. Witten also mentions that there is a
movement to remove GID from the DSM. Id. For the full diagnostic criteria for gen-
der identity disorder, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSITC STAT. MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS IV-TR 536 (2003).
81 Witten, supra note 72, at 220.
82 See Elizabeth C. Barcena, Will Sex Prevail Over the Best Interest of the
Child?, 11 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 14 (2003).
83 Only a few courts have ruled on the validity of transgender marriages. The
main issue in such cases is whether the state recognizes the individual's reassigned
sex. For the purposes of marriage, courts have recognized the individual's reassigned
sex. See, e.g., M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (upholding
validity of a marriage involving a transgender woman who underwent sex reassign-
ment surgery). However, other courts have ruled that a person's legal sex is irrevoca-
bly determined at birth. See, e.g., In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002)
(ruling that the marriage between a male-to-female transgender and her deceased
husband was invalid even though the sex reassignment surgery occurred years before
the marriage).
84 See Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive
Considerations on the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 45 B.C. L.
REv. 595, 597 n.9 (2004) (discussing the different ways in which a transgender can
enter a marriage).
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Unfortunately, statistics show that many transgender marriages
end in divorce. Historically, transgender marriage dissolutions have
resulted in either complete denial of the transgendered parent's cus-
tody and visitation with the children or supervised visitation rights for
the transgendered parent.86
Some courts have shown blatant prejudice towards transgenders
in denying child custody. In In re Darnell, a mother's parental rights
were terminated because of her continuing relationship with her for-
mer husband, a male-to-female transsexual, whose parental rights had
already been terminated.87 In its opinion the court cited a case holding
that parental rights may be terminated when the custodial parent does
not leave an abusive partner.88 However, the case at hand presented no
evidence that the transgender parent was abusive. 9
A number of social science arguments have been used to prevent a
transgender from obtaining custody of a child with whom they have
developed a parental relationship. Courts have allowed testimony that
a child's understanding about sexuality might be negatively affected
by continued contact with the transgender parent.9" Courts have also
entertained the idea that a child's mental and emotional health will be
affected by trouble in understanding the transgender parent's transi-
tion, the disturbance to their relationship with their transgender parent,
and conflicts in the relationship between their parents.91 In Cisek v.
Cisek, an Ohio Appeals Court denied visitation rights to a father who
decided to undergo sex reassignment after the divorce.92 In support of
its decision, the court cited medical testimony that the children might
experience mental harm and difficulty in adjusting their relationship
with their father.93 In J.L.S. v. D.K.S., the court reversed an order of
85 Phyllis Randolph Frye, Facing Discrimination, Organizing for Freedom:
The Transgender Community, in CREATING CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
CML RIGHTS 451, 454 (John D'Emilio et al. eds., 1st ed. 2000).
86 Id. at 455; CHOICE USA, CROSSING THE LINES: REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AS A
QUEER ISSUE 2 (2003), available at http://www.choiceusa.org/facts/lgbt.pdf.
87 619 P.2d 1349, 1352-53 (Or. Ct. App. 1980).
88 Id. at 1352 n.4 (citing State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. East, 589 P.2d 744
(Or. Ct. App. 1979)).
89 Id.
90 David Freedman et al., Children and Adolescents with Transsexual Par-
ents Referred to a Specialist Gender Identity Development Service: A Brief Report of
Key Developmental Features, 7 CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. & PSYCHIATRY 423, 424
(2002).
91 Id.
92 No. 80 C.A. 113, 1982 Ohio App. LEXIS 13335, at *3 (7th App. July 20,
1982).
9' Id. at *4.
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joint custody after the father pursued gender reassignment surgery.94
The court refused any visitation until "the children . . . [were]
emotionally and mentally suited for physical contact with their
father. . .."95
There is also a fear that a child's peer relationships may be ad-
versely affected through the stigma attached to the transgender parent.
In Daly v. Daly, the Nevada Supreme Court, over a strong dissent,
upheld the termination of a natural father's parental rights after he
underwent sex reassignment surgery. 96 The court's decision was based
on the effect his identity had on his daughter.97 Evidence was pro-
vided that his ten-year-old daughter was extremely upset by her father
becoming a woman, telling the court that she did not want to visit
him.98 In a parting shot, the court asserted that "[i]t was strictly Tim
Daly's choice to discard his fatherhood. . . ."99 Upon review of this
case, John M. Ohle stated that although a child may not be able to
accept their parent's transgender way of life and will most likely re-
ceive some social prejudice on behalf of the transgender parent,
"never have courts ruled that a social animus is sufficient justification
to terminate parental rights. ' 100
Some courts have granted transgender parents custody and visita-
tion rights upon the condition that the transgender repress their gender
identity issues and keep them secret from the children. In In re Mar-
riage of D.F.D. and D. G.D., a father who had cross-dressed, but who
was in therapy and whose child was unaware of the cross-dressing,
won a reversal of a trial court decision granting sole custody to the
mother and only supervised visitation to the father'
Although courts have typically viewed a transgender parent as a
threat to a child's best interests, some courts have found a transgender
as a parent to be non-threatening. In In re Custody of TJ., an appeals
court affirmed the decision to award child custody to a male-to-female
14 943 S.W.2d 766, 775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
9' Id. at 773-74.
96 715 P.2d 56 (Nev. 1986).
17 Id. at 58 n.4.
98 Id. at 58.
99 Id. at 59.
10o John M. Ohle, Constructing the Trannie: Transgender 'People and the
Law, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 237, 264 (2004).
'0' 862 P.2d 368, 376-77 (Mont. 1993). See also Mayfield v. Mayfield, No.
96AP030032, 1996 WL 489043 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 14, 1996) (holding that a fa-
ther's proclivity to cross-dress does not prevent him from being a loving and capable
parent); In re Welfare of V.H., 412 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); and P.L.W.
v. T.R.W., 890 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that a father who mastur-
bates in women's clothing is not barred from his parental visitation rights).
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transgender. 10 2 The court reasoned its decision by citing the child's
knowledge of and ability to deal with his father's transgender iden-
tity. 10 3 The court stated that there was no evidence that the child had
any gender identity confusion of his own and there was no evidence
that the transgender parent would provide future issues for the
child.' 4 Similarly, in Christian v. Randall, the court denied a father's
attempt to regain custody from a former wife who had become a male
because the children were happy and well-adjusted.'0 5 In making its
decision, the court relied on a Colorado statute that precludes the
court's consideration of "conduct . . . that does not affect [the par-
ent's] relationship with the child."'10 6
C. Scientific Evidence
There are no available statistics regarding how many children in
the United States have a transgender parent.l0 7 However, recent statis-
tics estimate that up to one-third of the transgenders attending a gen-
der identity clinic have children. 10 8 The amount of published research
examining the social and psychological development of children of
transgender parents is astoundingly small. However, the little data that
exists shows that children of transgender parents are not negatively
impacted by their parent's gender dysphoria.109
In 1978, a study was conducted regarding the sexual identity of
thirty-seven children raised by homosexual or transsexual parents.110
The children ranged in age from three to twenty years and lived in the
sexually atypical households for one to sixteen years. Thirty-six of the
children report or recall childhood toys, games, clothing, and peer
group preferences that are typical for their sex. The thirteen older
children who reported erotic fantasies or overt sexual behaviors were
all heterosexually oriented. The same author of the 1978 study
published a similar study in 1998,111 which concluded that children of
transgender parents are "more likely to be hurt by a traumatic
102 No. C2-87-1786, 1988 WL 8302, at *34 (Minn. App. Feb. 9, 1988).
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 516 P.2d 132, 133 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973).
106 Id. at 134.
107 CIANCIOTTO & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 28.
108 Freedman et al., supra note 90, at 424.
109 CIANCIOTO & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 21-22.
110 Richard Green, Sexual Identity of 37 Children Raised by Homosexual or
Transsexual Parents, 135 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 692 (1978).
111 Green, supra note 1.
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separation from their parent than because of that parent's gender
identity."' 2
A separate investigation was conducted in the United Kingdom in
2002 to examine whether and how parental gender role influences
children's gender development, mental health, family relationship and
peer relationships."13 The data collected from the investigation
repeated the conclusion of the 1978 study and reported that none of
the children developed any characteristics of their own gender identity
disorder. 114 The authors of the 2002 report compared their results with
those of the 1978 report and stated that:
Both audits clearly indicated that having a member of the
family with gender identity concerns presented a challenge to
family relationships, with both children of transsexual parents
and children with their own gender identity concerns re-
cording high levels of parent-child relationship problems. The
case notes of children of transsexual parents also revealed
high levels of conflict between their parents. However, the
children of transsexual parents did not record high levels of
depression or misery." 5
The authors of the 2002 report also report similarities between the
feelings of loss and disruption of a child of a transgender parent and
those of children experiencing other familial losses or disruptions,
such as the separation of parents, a new partner of a parent, or the
prolonged illness or medical treatment of a parent." 6 Both the 1978
study and the 2002 report suggest that children of transgender parents
are likely to experience difficulties in the familial relationship.
However, nothing in either study indicates that these difficulties are
much different from other, similar difficulties that children of non-
transgender parents experience while growing up.
112 CIANCIOTrO & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 22.
113 Freedman et al., supra note 90, at 423.
114 Id. at 428-29.
115 Id. at 429.
116 Id. at 430.
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IV. THE USE OF RACE, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND
RELIGION AS FACTORS IN ADOPTION AND
CUSTODY DECISIONS
The American Law Institute (ALI) prohibits custody decisions
based on "race, ethnicity, sex," 7 religion, sexual orientation, extra-
marital sexual conduct, 1 8 or the parents' financial circumstances,' 19
except in very limited circumstances."'' 20 However, the legal system
has historically employed the presence of such immutable characteris-
tics to deny adoptions and refuse custody claims. In many of these
cases courts apply a "nexus test," under which some of the above
listed factors are relevant to a custody decision only if they have ad-
versely affected the child's well-being or it is likely that the factor will
adversely affect the child in the future. 121 Unfortunately, the malle-
ability of the BIOC standard has allowed some judges to inject their
ideological views into custody decisions. 22 In many of these deci-
sions, besides the presence of the undesirable characteristic, the de-
nied parent was fit.
117 For nearly a century, courts decided child custody issues with a presump-
tion in favor of the child's mother. However, by 1990 this presumption was either
eliminated or downgraded to a factor used in the BIOC standard. Mason et al., supra
note 49, at 436. See also Exparte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 695-96 (Ala. 1981) (hold-
ing that a presumption in favor of maternal custody for children of "tender years"
unconstitutionally discriminates on the basis of sex).
118 A discreet extramarital affair will normally not be a consideration in de-
termining custody. However, it will become a factor if the relationship represents a
threat, has harmful sexual overtones, or puts the child in embarrassing situations.
119 Note that Michael Kantaras's ability to provide for the financial security of
the children was a primary focus of the court. Kantaras v. Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA,
at 158 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Feb. 21, 2003), available at http://www.courttv.com/archive/
trials/kantaras/docs/opinion.pdf, rev'd, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
120 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.12 (2002).
121 Helen Y. Chang, My Father is a Woman, Oh No!: The Failure of the
Courts to Uphold Individual Substantive Due Process Rights for Transgender Parents
Under the Guise of the Best Interest of the Child, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 649, 685
(2003) (arguing that a parent's gender change should be used as merely one factor in
determining custody and visitation arrangements).
122 James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children's Existing Rights in State Deci-
sion Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 845, 927 (dis-
cussing that although courts should treat sexual activity and sexual orientation within
the nexus test, judges are "tempted to manipulate the rule to whatever end their ideo-
logical viewpoint inclines them").
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Race and gender are immutable characteristics with which a per-
son is born and cannot change.1 23 However, the classification of sex-
ual orientation and religion are not as transparent. Courts have de-
bated whether sexual orientation is immutable or whether a person
chooses to engage in homosexual conduct. 24 Similarly, courts often
believe that religion is a subject of experience and choice and can be
changed. 12 5 The immutability of a person's gender identity can simi-
larly be debated.126 A significant portion of the population identifies
with the gender with which they are born, but transgenders do not
identify with their assigned gender. 127 However, the amount of control
a transgender has in acting upon their opposite gender identity is de-
bated.128 It is for these reasons that it is useful to consider judicial
treatment of both immutable and changeable characteristics in adop-
tion and child custody decisions.
Although courts have used immutable characteristics to deny
adoptions and custody requests, the past decade has shown a shift in
legal thought from intolerance to understanding, if not acceptance.
Courts are no longer viewing gay lifestyles or the presence of a parent
of a different race as negative per se to the adoption or custody of a
child. 129 Such progressive decisions are possible because courts are
123 Patricia Stirling, The Use of Trade Sanctions as an Enforcement Mecha-
nism for Basic Human Rights: A Proposal for Addition to the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 11 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 10 (1996).
124 Julie A. Baird, Playing it Straight: An Analysis of Current Legal Protec-
tions to Combat Homophobia and Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Intercolle-
giate Athletics, 17 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 31, 65 (2002). This debate is often struc-
tured with proponents of gay rights arguing that sexual preference is a suspect classi-
fication and the opposition claiming morality reasons for denial. Ann M. Reding,
Note, Lofton v. Kearney: Equal Protection Mandates Equal Adoption Rights, 36 U.C.
DAVIS L. REv. 1285, 1295 (2003).
125 See James W. Gilliam, Jr., Toward Providing a Welcoming Home for All:
Enacting a New Approach to Address the Longstanding Problems Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, and Transgender Youth Face in the Foster Care System, 37 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 1037, 1061 (2004) (comparing religious preferences to sexual orientation).
126 Phyllis Randolph Frye, The International Bill of Gender Rights vs. The
Cider House Rules: Transgenders Struggle with the Courts Over What Clothing They
are Allowed to Wear on the Job, Which Restroom They are Allowed to Use on the
Job, Their Right to Marry, and the Very Definition of Their Sex, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 133,199 (2000).
127 CIANcIOrro & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 12.
128 John Alan Cohan, Parental Duties and the Right of Homosexual Minors to
Refuse "Reparative" Therapy, 11 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 67, 73 (2002/2003) (discussing
whether transgenders are born into their sexual preference).
129 See J.B.F. v. J.M.F., 730 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997) (holding
that custody should be determined on the parent's individual character and parenting
skills, and not on his or her sexual preference), rev'd, 730 So. 2d 1190 (Ala. 1998).
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engaging in full factual analyses of each individual case to find
whether the parent or parental candidate is able to meet the physical,
mental and emotional needs of each individual child in question. The
following sections provide an overview of the transformation of legal
usage of such immutable characteristics in relation to adoption and
child custody decisions.
A. Race Cannot Be Used to Reflect Bias
In 1984, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Palmore v. Sidoti, a
race-based case, ruling that, although the best interests of the child
might require taking the race of the parents into account, the usage of
such a factor indicates societal prejudice and is impermissible.130 The
state argued that a child with parents of a different race was likely to
suffer social stigmatization. 13 1 The Court saw a problem in basing the
custody order on the "risk that a child living with a stepparent of a
different race may be subject to a variety of pressures and stresses not
present if the child were living with parents of the same racial or eth-
nic origin. , 132 As such, the Court refused to consider private biases as
a reason to deny custody.
133
Similarly, in 1994, Congress passed the Multiethnic Placement
Act, 134 which prevents adoption or foster care agencies receiving fed-
eral assistance from delaying or denying an adoptive placement solely
on the basis of race. Agencies may use race as "one of a number of
factors used to determine the best interests of a child.'
' 35
Therefore, both the Supreme Court and the legislature have de-
cided that race may be used as a factor in determining both adoption
and child custody decisions as long as the use is restricted to actual
impact. Such decisions must reflect the optimal situation for the child
and are not permitted to reflect the personal bias of the judge or any-
one else involved in the decision.
130 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984). See also Rayside, supra
note 39, at 369-70 (discussing the link of Palmore to gay and lesbian custody claims).
131 See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
132 Id. Although the rule from Palmore extinguished the use of race as a de-
terminative factor in child custody decisions, debate regarding transracial adoptions
thrives. See Kenneth L. Karst, Law, Cultural Conflict, and the Socialization of Chil-
dren, 91 CAL. L. REv. 967, 983 (2003); and Donna B. McElroy, The Consideration of
Race in Child Placement: Does It Serve the Best Interests of Black and Biracial Chil-
dren?, 2 MARGINS 231, 254 (2002).
"' See Palmore, 466 U.S. at 433.
134 42 U.S.C. § 5115a (1994).
13' 42 U.S.C. § 5115a(a)(2).
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B. Courts May Use Religion if Evidence of Harm to the Child
The legal system affords a great amount of judicial respect toward
the religious beliefs of either party involved in a child custody dis-
pute.136 In fact, some state legislatures allow children to be matched
with adoptive families of the same religion.137 However, a parent's
religion is not normally a factor in deciding custody unless there is
evidence of potential or present harm to the child. 138 Examples of
situations where the court will view religion as a factor include where
the parent engages in unusual "cult" activities or has an unorthodox
lifestyle that is likely to put the child in danger or be detrimental to the
best interest of the child. 39 However, some evidence does exist that
courts favor the parent thought to provide a more religious upbring-
ing.140 In summary, unless evidence exists that the child will be
harmed by the parent's religion, courts will not usually consider relig-
ion a factor in determining the most favorable custodial arrangement
for the child.1
4
'
C. Sexual Orientation May be Considered if it Affects the Child
Directly
Another instructive analogy to the issue of transgender custody
can be drawn from the treatment of sexual orientation in adoptions
and child custody disputes. Courts are permitted to consider a parent's
homosexuality when awarding custody or visitation, but only as it
may directly affect the child. 142 Other corollary situations related to
136 Bruce MacDougall, The Legally Queer Child, 49 MCGILL L.J. 1057, 1079
(2004) (discussing the deference given to religion in child custody suits involving a
homosexual parent).
137 Arkansas, Minnesota and California are among the states allowing a reli-
gious match in adoptions. See Gilliam, supra note 125, at 1060-61.
138 Jennifer Ann Drobac, Note, For the Sake of the Children: Court Consid-
eration of Religion in Child Custody Cases, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1609, 1619 (1998).
Some courts view a parent's religion as a proper consideration under the morality
inquiry of the BIOC standard. Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of
Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FoRDHAM L.
REv. 383, 397 (1989) (noting the consensus among courts to consider moral and spiri-
tual welfare for the best interest of the child).
139 See Drobac, supra note 138, at 1619.
140 See, e.g., Crowson v. Crowson, 742 So. 2d 107, 112 (La. Ct. App. 1999)
(upholding award of custody based in large part on fact that father "provided the
most, if not only, exposure to church and religion").
141 Beschle, supra note 138, at 399.
142 See Mohrman v. Mohrman, 565 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989)
(refusing to consider mother's lesbian relationship in appeal of custody denial, but
upholding based on her alcoholism); and M.J.P. v. J.G.P., 640 P.2d 966, 968 (Okla.
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homosexuality in general, e.g., the community's negative feelings
toward a parent's homosexuality, may not be considered when award-
ing custody.143 One would presume this relatively judicious applica-
tion of law would be applicable to other sexual minorities as well.
These decisions provide hope for the transgender parent because a
person's gender dysphoria is just as inherent as a person's sexual
preference. 44 If inherent characteristics like sexual preference are not
used to determine whether a person is fit to form a parental relation-
ship with a child, the same argument should be used to exclude the
use of a person's transgender status to deny the continuance of a pa-
rental relationship that has already formed. "[Transgender] parents
relate to their children as parents, not as [transgenders].' 45 Thus, if a
transgender is able to provide for a child's physical, emotional, and
mental needs, the transgender should be considered for the role of
custodial parent, regardless of his or her gender identity.
1. Almost Every State Allows for Same-Sex Adoption
Throughout the United States, a number of courts and administra-
tive agencies have ruled that a person's sexual preference does not
play a role in determining whether they are fit to adopt a child. 146 In
fact, twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have state laws
and policies that expressly ban discrimination against gay or lesbian
parents in custody or visitation disputes. 147 In 1995, second parent
1982) (ruling that the "determining factor should be the effect the homosexual rela-
tionship has on the child and if found to be detrimental to the child's well-being or an
impairment to his emotional or physical health ... ").
141 See S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878-79 (Alaska 1985) (ruling that "it
is impermissible to rely on any real or imagined social stigma attaching to Mother's
status as a lesbian"). But see Dailey v. Dailey, 635 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1981) (court was persuaded by an expert who testified that the child would be dam-
aged by the peer pressure and social stigma associated with homosexuality).
144 The immutability of gender identity has been heavily debated. See Her-
nandez-Montiel v. INS, 225 F.3d 1084, 1094 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a female
identity in homosexual men with female tendencies is immutable because it is inher-
ent in their identities). But see Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d 223, 230 (Tex. App.
1999) (refusing to view gender identity as immutable).
145 Eileen P. Huff, Student Comment, The Children of Homosexual Parents:
The Voices the Courts Have Yet to Hear, 9 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 695,
696 (2001).
146 Hastings Wyman, New GLBT Political and Policy Developments: Five
Years of Progress, in HANDBOOK OF GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER
ADMINISTRATION AND POLICY 91, 117 (Wallace Swan ed., 2004).
147 Id. (also stating that Alabama, North Carolina, and Utah have the worst
records for such policies).
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adoption was legislatively recognized in Vermont; Connecticut passed
similar legislation in 2000.148
As long as the procedural requirements of the pertinent adoption
statutes are met, almost every state allows same-sex couples to adopt
children.' 49 Jurisdictions where adoption is not determined by a
parent's sexual orientation have indicated that if a child is already
adjusted and living with the same-sex couple, removal from the living
situation would be traumatic and not in the child's best interest. 5 ° In
Vermont's seminal same-sex adoption case, Adoption of B.L. V.B., the
court stated that "[s]ocial fragmentation and the myriad configurations
of modem families have presented us with new problems and
complexities that cannot be solved by idealizing the past. Today a
child who receives proper nutrition, adequate schooling and
supportive sustaining shelter is among the fortunate, whatever the
source."'
151
Additionally, a number of professional organizations, including
the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), the National Association
of Social Workers, and the American Psychological Association
(APA), have "recognize[d] that gay and lesbian parents are just as
good as heterosexual parents, and that children thrive in gay- and
lesbian-headed families."'' 52 In February 2002, the AAP released a
Policy Statement entitled Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by
Same-Sex Parents encouraging members to "[a]dvocate for initiatives
that establish permanency through coparent or second-parent adoption
for children of same-sex partners."153 Denise Lieberman, Legal
Director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri
believed the AAP's statement signified its belief that "same sex
couples can raise kids just as well as straight couples. A judge [will]
148 Rayside, supra note 39, at 370.
149 Eleanor Michael, Note, Approaching Same-Sex Marriage: How Second
Parent Adoption Cases Can Help Courts Achieve the "Best Interests of the Same-Sex
Family," 36 CONN. L. REV. 1439, 1447 (2004). Florida and Mississippi have laws
forbidding adoption by homosexuals. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West 2005)
(stating, "No person eligible to adopt under this statute may adopt if that person is a
homosexual"); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-17-3 (West 1999) (prohibiting same-sex
couples from adopting).
150 Michael, supra note 149, at 1448.
151 628 A.2d 1271, 1275 (Vt. 1993) (quoting In re Evan, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997,
1002 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992)).
152 CIANCIOTTO & CAHILL, supra note 67, at 21.
153 American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of
Child and Family Health, Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents,
109 PEDIATRICS 339, 339-40 (2002).
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have to find specific grounds about a person to deny him an adoption,
not just that he's gay."' 154
2. States are Progressing Towards the Allowance of Same-Sex
Custody
In the 1980s, a number of custody decisions favorable to the gay-
lesbian movement required that the custodial parent refrain from any
outwardly gay behavior, essentially keeping his or her lifestyles "in
the closet."'155 In the 1990s, a number of state appeals courts created a
categorical exclusion that shielded children from any exposure to ho-
mosexual behavior.1
56
Upon reversing a lower court's determination that a mother was
unfit for parenting based on her homosexuality, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court in Bezio v. Patenaude quoted a clinical psychologist's
testimony that a parent's sexual preference typically has no
detrimental impact on his or her children.1 57 Based largely upon
studies pointing to the lack of harmful effects to children of lesbian
and gay parents, courts have begun to view a parent's sexual
preference as a non-factor in child custody disputes. 58 In TB. v.
L.R.M, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered whether a non-
biological partner could legally obtain custody of a child co-parented
between two lesbians.' 59 The decision upheld the right of the non-
biological partner to seek custody under the "in loco parentis"
doctrine (Latin for "in the place of a parent"). In awarding the non-
biological partner custody of the child, the court determined that the
important consideration in a custody case is whether the person
seeking custody has acted as a parent, not what that person's gender
identity is.
The above information illustrates that courts are inconsistent in
their treatment of sexual orientation as a factor in child custody dis-
putes. Some states treat a parent's sexual orientation as a neutral fac-
tor, only denying such rights if the parent's sexual orientation or ac-
154 Kenneth Hailer, The American Academy of Pediatrics Coparent or Sec-
ond-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents Policy Statement: its Science, Its Implica-
tions, 6 J. GAY & LESBIAN MED. ASS'N 29, 31 (2002).
155 Rayside, supra note 39, at 369-70.
156 Id. at 370.
157 Bezio v. Patenaude, 410 N.E.2d 1207, 1215-16 (Mass. 1980).
158 Barry M. Parsons, Case Note, Bottoms v. Bottoms: Erasing the Presump-
tion Favoring a Natural Parent Over Third Parties- What Makes This Mother Unfit?,
2 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REv. 457,458 (1994).
15' 786 A.2d 913 (Pa. 2001).
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tivities are proven to harm the child. 160 However, other states treat a
parent's sexual orientation as a reason to deny that parent custody or
restrict visitation, regardless of a showing of harm.16 1 Reasons for
using a parent's sexual orientation as a factor in child custody disputes
include arguments that homosexuality is immoral, that unmarried co-
habitation is immoral, and that the children will face stigma.
162
V. HOW COURTS SHOULD ADDRESS
TRANSGENDER PARENTS
A. The Family Construct in the Best Interests of the Child Has
Changed
The definition of family in the United States is a changing concept
and a number of family situations exist where non-parents play the
parental role in a child's life. Although not currently given priority
within the legal system, non-parents have shown that they are capable
of raising children in environments that are just as caring and func-
tional as those found in the traditional family.163 In fact, the American
Law Institute's Principles of Law of Family Dissolution has recog-
160 Phyllis G. Bossin et al., A White Paper: An Analysis of the Law Regarding
Same-Sex Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Partnerships, 38 FAM. L.Q. 339,
345-46 (2004) (arguing that in discussing custody issues, courts are increasingly
viewing sexual orientation as a neutral factor). See, e.g., In re Marriage of Ca-
balquinto, 669 P.2d 886, 888 (Wash. 1983) (court ruled that homosexuality in and of
itself is not a bar to custody or to reasonable right of visitation); A v. A, 514 P.2d 358,
360 (Or. Ct. App. 1973) (court ruled that the fact that the father is a homosexual is not
sufficient for a change of custody without showing an adverse effect on the children's
welfare); and State ex. rel. Human Serv. Dep't., 764 P.2d 1327, 1330 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988) (court decided that the child should be placed with his uncle, whose homosexu-
ality had no significant bearing on the best interests of the child).
161 Bossin et al., supra note 160, at 346. See, e.g., Ex rel J.M.F., 730 So. 2d
1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998) (modifying custody to father and declaring a preference for
father's heterosexual marriage to mother's same-sex relationship); and Taylor v.
Taylor, 47 S.W.3d 222 (Ark. 2001) (affirming a restriction on custody to the mother
that allowed the mother custody only if she did not live in a house with her same-sex
partner or have the partner as an overnight guest).
162 For a full discussion on these arguments see Matt Larsen, Lawrence v.
Texas and Family Law: Gay Parents' Constitutional Rights in Child Custody Pro-
ceedings, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 53, 74-95 (2004).
163 Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Ap-
proach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REv. 835, 893 (2000)
("Parenthood... is increasingly seen as a functional status, rather than one derived
from biology or legal entitlement."). See also Developments in the Law: IV. Changing
Realities of Parenthood: The Law's Response to the Evolving American Family and
Emerging Reproductive Technologies 116 HARv. L. REv. 2052,2054 (2003).
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nized two new categories of parents that address the evolving family:
"parent[s] by estoppel" and "de facto" parents.' 64 A "parent by estop-
pel" has "lived with the child since the child's birth, holding out and
accepting full and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a
prior co-parenting agreement with the child's legal parent... ,,65 A
"de facto" parent has resided with the child and, with the consent of
the legal parent, performed a share of parental functions.
66
Regardless of their gender identity, a transgender can be a natural
parent or fill the role of either a parent by estoppel or a de facto par-
ent. Therefore, even though the law may not legally recognize a trans-
gender as a parent, biology and familial roles will provide the trans-
gender an opportunity to fill such a role. Thus, whether or not the law
wants to legally award child custody to transgenders, family con-
structs involving transgenders in parental roles will exist.
In situations where a transgender plays the role of a parent, either
biologically or socially, the individual is afforded the opportunity to
function as a "good parent," the same opportunity given to any parent.
As discussed above, state legislatures have used the BIOC standard to
describe the characteristics that afford one parent preferred custodial
status. Generally, the BIOC standard seeks to evaluate the abilities of
a parent to provide for the physical, mental, and emotional needs of
the child. Therefore, whichever parent is able to provide the most in
relation to the child's needs should be awarded custody of the child.
B. Finding Gender Dysphoria an Immutable Characteristic
Dependent upon which side of the debate considered, gender dys-
phoria is either an immutable disorder that a person is born with or a
person's gender identity is something that can be chosen and acted
upon at the discretion of the individual. The medical profession views
transgenders as having a mental disorder that is treatable in some in-
stances. The legal system should adopt the medical profession's opin-
ion of transgenders and similarly find this disorder an immutable
characteristic.
Although the courts are presently inconsistent in treatment of
other immutable characteristics, a number of courts are only consider-
164 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1) (2002). However, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws' new draft of the Uniform Parentage Act provides no
recognition of de facto parents, psychological parents or parents by estoppel. See
generally UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 299 (2000).
165 PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 164,
§ 2.03(1)(b)(iii).
I d. § 2.03(1)(c).
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ing these immutable characteristics in child custody decisions if they
truly have an impact on the child's well being. Arguably, courts
should approach transgenderism in the same manner, that is, only if
the parent's gender dysphoria negatively impacts the child. Therefore,
analogous to the treatment of race in child custody and adoption deci-
sions, consideration of a parent's gender dysphoria should not further
private biases. Courts should also treat a parent's gender identity simi-
lar to the treatment afforded to religion; a parent's transgenderism
should only be considered if there is evidence that it is likely to harm
the child. Finally, courts should follow the path emerging in sexual
orientation adoption and custody decisions by granting transgender
parents custody of children if the situation is deemed to be in the best
interests of the child.
C. Scientific Data Shows Little Chance of Harm to Children of Trans-
gender Parents
Family law frequently lags behind social change. 167 Often when
an area of family law is antiquated, scientific data aids in the reflec-
tion of emerging social constructs. 68 The use of the BIOC standard to
deny perfectly fit parents who are also transgenders is an example of a
situation where family law has fallen behind social realties. Social
science research has confirmed what experience and common sense
already suggest: namely, that love, stability, patience, and time to
spend with a child are far more critical factors in being a good parent
than a person's gender identity. Therefore, if a transgender parent
proves his desire and ability to provide for the welfare of a child, the
transgender condition in itself should not be a bar to custody.
The presence of empirical data evidencing that a parent's gender
dysphoria does not negatively impact a child is essential in continuing
courts down the path of appropriately considering a parent's
transgenderism only in negative circumstances. However, the
presence of this data and its ongoing creation is nowhere near the
amount of social data related to the impact of same-sex parents on
children. As such, the need for more social science experiments and
the documentation of results is paramount to the willingness of courts
to properly consider the confusing and often controversial issues
related to transgenders.
167 Mason et al., supra note 49, at 432-33 (discussing how the reasoning in
family law legislation and case law is often provided by social science experts).
168 Id.
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D. The Ultimate Goal is Finding the Parent Who Best Fits the Child's
Needs
Unfortunately, courts have historically refused to apply the full
BlOC analysis and have used a parent's gender identity to deny cus-
tody to the transgender parent. Most of these decisions lacked a nega-
tive link between the parent's gender identity and their capacity to be
a good parent. This is especially true in those child custody cases
where the transgender parent already functioned as a good parent.
Within the sphere of transgender child custody, courts need to be-
come less focused on the definition of the relationship between the
parents and more focused on the existence of a positive-functioning
relationship between the children and the parent or parental figure.
Custody decisions should be granted in favor of the parent proving
devotion to the children and the ability to provide a stable family envi-
ronment. Courts also need to separate the fact of a parent's gender
identity from the effect it has on the children involved in the issue.
Additionally, courts should attempt to have both parents involved in
the child's life rather than terminate a transgender's parental rights.
To foster such an attempt, courts should allow the children to go to
counseling and allow the transgender parent an attempt to foster a
relationship with the child.
CONCLUSION
Medical and social science fields have long recognized that peo-
ple may identify with the gender opposite with which they were born.
Unfortunately, courts have lagged behind acceptance of this social
issue. With the advancement of treatment and therapy options avail-
able to transgenders, the presence of transgender parents in child cus-
tody disputes will continue to occur. Thus, the legal profession must
prepare to face this issue.
Additionally, it does not seem plausible that the standard for de-
termining child custody will change from the BIOC standard. There-
fore, the court system must determine ways in which to apply the
unique issues presented by the presence of a transgender parent in a
child custody dispute. Evaluation of the effect of a parent's gender
identity upon a child should be the most important issue involving
transgender parents and child custody. Although a small amount of
scientific data exists on the topic, that which currently exists points to
the conclusion that a transgender parent does not negatively impact
most children. As evidenced by the change in courts' attitudes regard-
ing gay and lesbian adoptions and custodial decisions, reliable scien-
tific data is the key to changing the court system's outlook on award-
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ing custody of children to transgenders. Additionally, courts must
individually consider the facts of each case and honestly appraise a
parent's ability to meet the physical, mental, and emotional needs of
the child, regardless of their gender identity. Such a process will re-
place judicial bias towards transgender parents and will ensure that
courts justly determine which custody placement is in the best inter-
ests of a child.
